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CORRESPONDENCE
To the editors:

Word had come of Herman Belz's attack on me and A March
of Liberty several days before the Summer issue of Constitutional
Commentary arrived, and so it was with some interest that I turned
to the fifteen-page "review."
Evidently, my abiding sin in Professor Belz's eyes is that I am a
"liberal," and that from this unpardonable crime all sorts of heinous results flow, including my support of the Supreme Court's expansion and defense of civil rights and liberties.
While I could certainly respond to Belz in kind ("You're a conservative!!!), I think the readers of Constitutional Commentary might
well wish to look at the book themselves. It is, after all, a text for
college and graduate courses in constitutional history, and has even
been adopted in some law schools. They might also wish to compare how I treat issues with that of a competitor, Professor Belz's
revision of Kelly and Harbison.
Sincerely,
Melvin I. Urofsky
Professor of History
Virginia Commonwealth
University

Herman Belz replies:

For reasons that he chooses not to disclose, Professor Urofsky
does not dispute any of the details of my analysis of his book. He
misunderstands in asserting that I hold his liberalism to be a sin,
from which flows his support of civil liberties. It is his uncritical
support-as he concedes--of civil rights and civil liberties that
leads him into his inaccuracies and scholarly errors.
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To the editors:

Lino A. Graglia must have felt he really had something to say
about the growing field of Law and Literature. After all, his review
of Richard Posner's new book had already been published elsewhere before it appeared in the pages of this journal (vol. 6, p. 437);
but unless your editors were looking for an adulatory piece about
Posner, I question the wisdom of revivifying Graglia's superficial
analyses.
Graglia, unlike some four dozen law professors now teaching
in the field (see Elizabeth Gemmette's survey of Law and Literature
teaching at 23 Valparaiso L. Rev. 267), was ill-prepared to comment
intelligently about one of the major interdisciplinary movements of
our generation. He seems to excuse his own ignorance early in the
review, when he observes generally about lawyers that a "craftsman's scrupulousness" need not define our work.
Perhaps Graglia feels that way, but I am sure most lawyersand certainly most law professors-aspire to craftsmanship and
care in their work. Given his own standard, Graglia not surprisingly relies almost entirely upon Posner to teach him about literature. Yet Posner's book quickly situates its author as an "amateur"
in matters literary, and this journal's readers might have hoped for
a more objective critique of the book's incessant belligerence against
earlier scholars' efforts.
Ironically, Graglia manages to make this point late in his review, but he is speaking there about unnamed practitioners of Law
and Literature who need meet "less demanding" standards of literary criticism and theory than those actually in literature departments. Yet this unproven assertion would apply far more to Posner
(and to Graglia himself) than to those who have pioneered law
school work in the field. Indeed, the comment also serves to characterize much of the Law and Economics field, which Graglia
otherwise worships in an almost kneejerk reflex. Posner would be
the first to admit that his economic analyses may not meet with the
approval of a majority of "real" economists in the academy.
The point is that Law and Literature, like Law and Economics,
has had much to say to a legal academy dissatisfied with the narrowing unidisciplinary constraints of the past few decades. Its practitioners-including James Boyd White and the present writer, who
both fall prey to Graglia's absolutely mindless attack in the review-often have considerably more formal training in literature
than legal economists have in economics. In fact, our work actually
crosses the disciplinary frontier; my own approach to Dostoevski's
legal obsession has recently been incorporated in critical editions of
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Notes From Underground and Crime and Punishment, and the Melville world has been most sensitive to law school debates on Billy
Budd, Sailor.
The only paragraph of real analysis-rather than uncritical
parroting-occurs when Graglia tries to understand why a cost-effective writer like Posner would spend so much of his time attacking Law and Literature. Graglia claims that Posner "has scores to
settle" with those who have disliked his brand of legal economics.
If true, this would be a damning description of the motives behind a
book-length effort; but in fact I (and most others in the field) have
never deigned to criticize Posner. (An exception is Robin West,
whose comparison of Posner and Kafka made quite a hit in the
Harvard Law Review recently, but Graglia strangely overlooks Professor West.)
Posner surely has good reason to enter the fray, and Graglia
has identified one unedifying motivation. But, had he read Posner
carefully, or even a small fraction of the primary and secondary
works the judge has perused (if often misunderstood), Graglia
would have perceived the rich menu offered by Law and Literature
to the legal world. Posner allows, for example, that central legal
issues such as the repression of revenge-urges are best addressed by
literary art. Other scholars have suggested that only fictional works
about law provide a full jurisprudential comprehension of the virtual identity between rhetoric and performance in our legal system.
Posner seizes the implication of the latter idea and applauds a renewal of legal stylistics; but he steadfastly declines the literature's
associated offer; to scrutinze the ethical base for the lawyer's often
articulate formulations.
Most earlier legal generations in our country took the literary
sources for law as a given (see Robert Ferguson's Law and Letters
in American Culture). For us, the Law and Literature movement
uniquely appreciates the fundamental sources-the life-affirming
sources-of law in its surrounding literary culture.
If Posner does fear, then, the incursion of Law and Literature
upon his own relatively arid and dull interdisciplinary turf, Graglia's unthinking acceptance of that fear can only be explained by the
following syllogism, pervasive in his review: Law and Literature
threatens a certain system of legal economics; that system is good;
Law and Literature is bad. But, uncraftsmanlike though he may be,
Graglia cannot hope to see that logic succeed with the vast majority
of this journal's readers.
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Let those readers scan Posner's book. Then let them read carefully the literary works Posner musters for his arguments and the
secondary works he dismisses out of fear.
Richard Weisberg
Visiting Professor of Law
UCLA, and
Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School

Lino Graglia replies:
"Graglia must have felt he really had something to say" about
law and literature! Gimme a break, I'm asked to review a book and
I review a book. Who needs something to say? It's true that Posner
and I are not as high on literary studies in law school as Weisberg,
but that does not show either Posner's "incessant belligerence" or
that I made an "absolutely mindless attack" on White and
Weisberg. Posner's discussion strikes me as quite peaceful, and my
basic criticism of White was that he says things like a judge should
determine what a decision "shall mean in the language of a
culture." The world divides into people who like that kind of talk
(law and lits) and those who consider it hot air; the latter may well
be insufficiently sensitive or perceptive, but they are not necessarily
mindless. If anything, they may be too much into real thought.
I am disappointed that literary study apparently does not
improve one's argumentation, either in substance, as by making it
less of a game and less pandering-"! am sure most lawyers-and
certainly most law professors" are scrupulous-or in style, as by
moderating the lawyer's urge to overstatement-"absolutely
mindless"?
"Who is Graglia," Weisberg might reply, "to complain of
overstatement?" But that of course would be unfair, because I am
not only, as he says of Posner, "an 'amateur' in matters literary,"
but, even worse, an amateur without quotation marks.

